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apart from those adjudicating proprietary water rights. Moreover, the
Supreme Court in California v. FERC upheld the supremacy of the FPA
over state law. Consequently, PacifiCorp argued that state law has no
role in the regulation of hydropower except in proprietary water
rights.
McConnell sought a permanent injunction directing PacifiCorp to
cease operation of the dams and reservoirs in a manner that caused the
aforementioned environmental hazards. The court held that the injunctive relief impermissibly intruded on the comprehensive regulatory scheme for a hydropower project. Three key decisions influenced
the court in its determination. First, the Supreme Court in First Iowa
Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n established federal preemption in
regards to hydropower. Second, Californiareaffirmed First Iowa's holding that the FPA established a comprehensive federal regime, subject
to a limited reservation of state authority. Finally, the Ninth Circuit
applied California in Sales Hydro Assoc. v. Maughan and held that the
FPA preempted the field of hydropower regulation. The court held
that the KHP is subject to the FPA, which gave FERC broad powers and
exclusive licensing authority of the development and operation of nonfederal hydroelectric projects on navigable waters.
Although the FPA prevents injunctive relief, Congress preserved
state-law damage remedies under 16 U.S.C. § 803. The FPA provides a
right to recover from a licensee for damages caused by the construction, maintenance, or operation of the projects. McConnell's nuisance
claim fell under state-law; therefore, the FPA did not bar their claim.
The court found that PacifiCorp's license did not have the specificity
required by the California Civil Code Section 3482 to gain exemption
from the nuisance claim. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court
explained in Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles,
that "although an activity authorized by statute cannot be a nuisance,
the manner in which the activity is performed may constitute a nuisance." McConnell alleged that the manner that PacifiCorp operated
the dams was a nuisance. As a result, the court did not bar the nuisance claim.
The court held that the FPA preempted McConnell's claim for injunctive relief. Consequently, the court granted PacifiCorp's motion
for judgment on McConnell's request for injunctive relief. However,
the court denied the motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings because the FPA allows for recovery based on damages caused by
the construction, operation, or maintenance of the hydroelectric plant.
Tamara Qureshi
Fitzgerald v. Harris, No. 07-16-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61806
(D. Me. August 20, 2007) (holding that the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
did not preempt state control of state owned lands along a river protected as "wild river area" and, as such, the state could permit motor
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vehicle access points and permanent bridges on the waterway even if
the state action jeopardized the river's protected status).
The U.S. Secretary of the Interior designated the Allagash Wilderness Waterway as a "wild river area" of the National Wild and Scenic
Rivers System under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act ("WSRA"). Pursuant to the WSRA, a "wild river area" is generally only accessible by
trail, the shorelines and watersheds are essentially primitive, and the
water is unpolluted. Further, the WSRA provided that the designated
rivers "shall be preserved in free-flowing condition" and not subject to
new federal water resources projects.
Two avid wilderness canoeists, Charles Fitzgerald and Kenneth
Cline ("the canoeists"), filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maine, against the Director of the Maine Bureau of Parks
and Lands ("MBPL Director"). The canoeists sought a declaration that
the WSRA preempted certain provisions of Maine state law ("AWW")
pertaining to motor vehicle access and permanency of bridges. The
canoeists further requested that the court enjoin the MBPL Director
from implementing the disputed provisions.
Under the theory of conflict preemption, the canoeists argued that
the disputed provisions of the AWW were invalid because there was an
irreconcilable conflict between the WRSA and those provisions. Specifically, the canoeists argued that the state law did not comply with the
intent of the WSRA to preserve the primitive qualities of the river and
it conflicted with the WSRA's standard for a "wild river area" of "inaccessible except by trail" because the disputed provisions provided for
six permanent bridges over the Allagash River and eleven motor vehicle access points.
The court looked to both the WRSA and the agency guidelines and
publications relating to the Act to determine whether conflict preemption existed. The court found that the WRSA did not compel the state
or local government to implement a particular plan with regard to the
designated river nor were there any binding provisions on the state
and local governments to protect the river. Instead, the WRSA merely
encouraged the state and local governments to employ land use planning to protect "river values."
While the administrative guidelines did not warrant full Chevron deference per the court, the court held they "do carry weight." According to the court, state and local governments retained full regulatory
power over non-federal areas of a WSRA protected river and limited
the federal role to cooperation and assistance per the agency guidelines. The court further found the WSRA's aim of permanently preserving the designated rivers did not override the regulatory power that
remained with the state.
The court held that this did not preclude the state from permitting
the eleven motor vehicle access points and six permanent watercourse
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crossings for a WSRA protected river because the federal statute did
not preempt the state's control of state owned land along the Allagash
River. As such, the court recommended that the district court grant
the MBPL Director's motion to dismiss.
JulieAnderson
United States v. Nevada, No. 2:00-CV-0268-RLH-LRL, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69177 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2007) (holding that a sudden, selfimposed need for water could not overcome the Nevada State Engineer's denial of the DOE's water permit application and cease and desist order).
The Department of Energy ("DOE") attempted to obtain Nevada
water permits in association with a proposal to create a nuclear waste
depository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The Nevada State Engineer
authorized temporary permits to the DOE, which expired April 9,
2002. The State Engineer denied the DOE's request to extend the
permits. The State Engineer also denied the DOE's 1997 application
for permanent appropriation of 430 acre-feet of groundwater in connection with the planned construction of the repository.
Meanwhile, the State Engineer and the DOE worked out an arrangement for DOE's interim use of water. Originally, the agreement
allowed for the use of potable water and water for emergency and fire
use. In 2003, the parties came to a "tentative agreement," which allowed an increase in DOE's water use to 1.36 million gallons per year.
The DOE had mentioned the need for an additional 300,000 gallons of
water for bore hole drilling for seismic investigation. However, the
State Engineer did not stipulate to that use. In 2004, the DOE announced that it would drill 35 bore holes, requiring an additional 2
million gallons of water. The State Engineer never approved the use of
the water. In 2007, the DOE announced that it would need 4 million
gallons of water and was planning on boring 48 holes. The State Engineer never agreed to the use of water for any of the proposed 48 holes.
The DOE began to use the water for the holes. The State Engineer
issued a cease and desist order to the DOE over the use of water for the
bore hole drilling. The DOE complained that the order was causing
delay and unnecessary expense, that the bore holes were necessary and
authorized by Congress, and that the Congressional mandate
preempted state water law. The State Engineer lifted the order on the
condition that the parties could reach an agreement. Eventually, the
State Engineer agreed to water use with certain conditions, namely that
the DOE could not use water for the purpose of additional phases or
expanded phases of the bore hole drilling. DOE did not accept the
limitation and the State Engineer reinstated the cease and desist order.
On July 20, 2007, the DOE filed an emergency injunction and resumed drilling operations. The DOE also refused entry on the site to

